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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,

Respondent,
Case
No. 8548

-vs.EUGENE JOHNSON,

Appellant.

Respondent's Brief
STATEMENT OF FACTS
In support of the information filed on the 14th day
of July, 1955, charging Eugene Johnson and Charles
Brooks with second-degree burglary (R. 5), the State
presented the following testimony at the trial held the
23rd and 24th days of September, 1955, the Honorable
Charles G. Cowley presiding.
The first witness called on behalf of the State was
Lew S. Birch. He testified that during the early morning
hours of July 3, 1955, while acting in the capacity of a
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police officer of Ogden City, he noticed a man walking
away from the front door of a closed shop (R. 9). As
the police officers approached, they called to him to
stop, which he did. Officer Birch alighted from the car,
made a quick search of the man, who is appellant herein,
and then started to examine the building by which the
appellant was first sighted. As the officer approached
the front of the building he saw another man inside the
shop (R. 10). Officer Birch found the front door locked
and then checked the building to see how the man inside
had gained entry. He discovered that a window in the
rear of the store had been broken (R. 11).
Upon the arrival of the officers that had been summoned to help, it was discovered that the appellant who
had been handcuffed and placed in the patrol car driven
by Officers Birch and Muller, had tried to escape (R. 12).
A quick search of the area was made and appellant was
found lying face down by a service station a short distance from the patrol car with his forehead badly cut
( R 12). The officers phoned the owner of the store and
when the owner's son arrived, they entered the store and
arrested Charles Brooks (R. 12).
Officer Birch testified that while appellant and
Brooks were being transported to the police station, the
appellant, in a conversation with him, did not deny
being implicated in the burglary and in fact, admitted
that he wns when he stated that, "there was too many
other 1wople involved·' for him to give the policemen
any information (R. 42-43). Officer Birch further testi-
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fied that after the appellant and his companion had been
taken to the police station he returned to the store and
examined the area around it. At the rear of the building
he located some tools and also a ladder which was partially covered with cardboard (R. 45). The window
through which Brooks entered the shop was 18 feet
above the ground (R. 47). He also testified that appellant and his companion, though they had alcohol on their
breath, did not appear to be drunk and both men were
able to talk and walk in a reasonably sober manner
(R. 29-40).
The next witness called by the State was David Muller. Mr. Muller testified to the following: That he was,
during the early morning hours of July 3, 1955, employed by Ogden City as a police officer; that he was
with Officer Birch on their regular rounds at that time
(R. 48). Mr. Muller's testimony corroborates the testimony of Officer Birch. It was Officer Muller who discovered that the appellant had apparently tried to escape
from the police car (R 50) and it was he who found the
appellant lying face down by a service station not far
from the shop with a cut on his forehead.
The State's next witness was L. A. Jacobson, also
an officer of the Ogden City Police Department. Mr.
Jacobson testified that upon hearing the radioed call
for help from Officers Muller and Birch he and his partner proceeded to the location given in the call (R. 58).
When they reached the store, they pulled their patrol
car into an alley at the rear of the store and it was then
3
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that Officer Jacobson first noticed the broken window
(R. 58). After starting to search for the appellant after
his attempt to escape, Jacobson returned to the ~tore
after the appellant had been found and examined the
rear of the building with a spotlight (R. 59). Shortly
thereafter he heard a noise from inside the building and
heard the man who was in the building apparently running towards the front. Officer Jacobson ran around
the building and arrived in front of the shop just as he
dropped to the floor behind a showcase. Officer Jacobson then talked with the appellant and asked him ''That
he had been doing in the vicinity of the store. The appellant said he was just on his way home (R. 60).
After the store owner's son had arrived and had
opened the front door, Officer Jacobson entered the
store and there confronted Charles Brooks, placing
him under arrest. At that time Brooks said, "Well, I
guess you got me cold turkey" (R. 60). Officer Jacobeson further testified that before appellant was taken
to the police station he, in a conversation with Officer
Jacobson, stated that, "I didn't go inside of the place
Jake, I will swear to that' ' ( R 64). After Officers Birch
and Muller had left for the police station with the
appellant and Brooks, Officer Jacobson returned to the
rear of the building and discovered some tools and a
ladder which had been hidden by covering it with cardboard (R. 61). In his examination of the building and
the area immediately surrounding it he found a plank
whieh was about 8 to 10 feet in length. It was lying at the
rear of the building (R. 68). It caught his attention and
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he checked it to see if with its use a person could have
reached the window which was about 18 feet above the
ground (R. 69). He testified that it was short and reached
only a little more than half-way up the building (R. 69).
Officer Jacobson also testified to the fact that he had
seen both the appellant and Brooks earlier in the evening in each other's company (R. 77).
The State's next witness was Mr. Glen Robbins. He
testified that during the early morning hours of July 3,
1955, he was aroused by the ringing of the telephone
and when he answered he was informed that his father's
store had been burglarized and was asked to come and
open up the store (R. 79). He was present when Officer
Jacobson confronted Brooks and when Brooks said
"something about you got me cold turkey" (R. 80). Mr.
Robbins made a quick tour through the store to see if
anything had been stolen. He also examined the cash
register. Mr. Robbins testified that the ladder did not
belong to the store and to his knowledge had not been
on the premises before (R. 81). With this the State closed
its case.
The defense called as its first witness the appellant,
Eugene Johnson, who was sworn and testified as follows: That during the afternoon of July 2, 1955, he
met Charles Brooks in downtown Ogden. They soon started drinking and continued to do so through the afternoon and evening (R. 22). It was his testimony that
during this time they both consumed quite a bit of wine
(R. 89). Late in the evening Brooks decided that he
wanted to go to the Dee Hospital to visit his mother.
5
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Appellant accompanied Brooks to the hospital and
waited outside (R. 89). After Brooks came out of the
hospital he talked to appellant and told him that his
sister lived not far from there and that he wished to go
see her (R. 89). Appellant claims by this time to have developed a bad cough and became ill, due to the amount of
wine consumed. After they arrived at Brooks' sister's
home they decided not to disturb the family, the house
being dark. At that time appellant mentioned to Brooks
that he wished to lie down because he was sick (R. 90).
They then walked behind some buildings looking for a
place where appellant could rest; they found a small fire
burning in a field and sat down beside it. Appellant
claims that as soon as he had stretched out on the ground
he fell asleep (R. 90). It is his story that he does not
know how long he was asleep and that when he awoke
Brooks was gone. Upon awakening he got up and walked
to the front of the building to see if there was a clock
inside. He did not see one and as he turned to leave he
was stopped by the policemen. The appellant claims
that after he had been handcuffed and placed in the
police car he felt very ill and nauseated. He maintains
that he did not try to escape but only left the car so that
he would not dirty it if he came sick to his stomach again
(R. 92). However, he does not explain why he ran away
from the rar in such a hurry that he stumbled and fell.
Appellant claims that he did not cooperate with
Brooks in planning the burglary of the store; that he did
not know that Brooks intended to burglarize the store
6
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and that he was in no way implicated in the burglary.
Under cross-examination appellant admitted that he had
a previous criminal record and that he had been convicted of a felony (R. 96).
The final witness called by the defense was Charles
Brooks, who testified substantially as did the appellant.
It is his story that he obtained entrance into the building
by climbing up the plank that was found by Officer J acobson (R. 105). Yet he claims to have done this while
drunk. Brooks claims to have found the plank leaning up
against the building and noticed that it almost reached
the window (R. 105). He makes the claim that it was
only curiosity that prompted him to climb up this plank
and enter the building. Once inside the building, Brooks
claims to have become so ill that he felt it necessary to
lie down and did so after he discovered that the plank
had apparently been knocked over. The flashlight that
was found in his possession he claims to have discovered
at the foot of the plank just before he started to climb up
it (R. 106). Brooks claims to have had no criminal intent
in entering the building; that his reason for entering was
unknown to him because of his drunken condition. He
claims never to have seen the ladder which was presented
as the State's Exhibit D during the trial (R. 112). He also
testified to the fact that he and the appellant never discussed burglarizing the store; (R. 108) never planned to
burglarize the store, nor did in fact cooperate in the
burglary (R. 109). Brooks, claiming that at the time he
gained entrance to the store, appellant was still asleep by
the fire (R. 105-106). Brooks also admits that he has a
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criminal record having been convicted of a felony previously (R. 112). With this the defense rested.
The matter was then submitted to the jury which
found appellant and Brooks guilty of burglary in the
second degree.

STATEMENT OF POINTS
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS
DISCRETION WHEN IT REFUSED TO
GRANT APPELLANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS THE INFORMATION BECAUSE WHEN
SUCH A MOTION IS MADE THE JUDGE
l\1UST ASSUME THE TRUTH OF THE
STATE'S EVIDENCE AND GIVE TO THE
STATE THE BENEFIT OF ALL THE LEGITIMATE INFERENCES TO BE DRAWN
THEREFROM.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS
DISCRETION WHEN IT REFUSED TO
GRANT APPELLANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS THE INFORMATION BECAUSE WHEN
SUCH A :MOTION IS MADE THE JUDGE
MUST ASSUl\1E THE TRUTH OF THE
STATE'S EVIDENCE AND GIVE TO THE
STATE THE BENEFIT OF ALL THE LEGITIMATE INFERENCES TO BE DRA \VN
THEREFROM.
Section 77-31-31, Utah Code Annotated 1953, provides in part as follows, concerning the responsibility
of a jury at a criminal trial. "On a trial * * * questions
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of law are to be decided by the court and questions the
fact by the jury * * *. '' The early case of People v.
Biddlecome, 3 Utah 208; 2 P. 194, established the law in
Utah wherein it was held that the jurors are the sole
judges of the facts. Also in the case of State v. Bayes,
47 Utah 474 155 P. 335, the court stated that it was the
exclusive province of the jury to judge the credibility
of witnesses. In making the motion to dismiss the information, counsel for appellant claims that the State had
not '' * * * established a prima facie case * * * '' nor had
the State produced any evidence showing criminal intent
on the part of Brooks or appellant. The evidence presented by the State has been summarized in the Statement of Facts. What did it show~ It placed before the
jury the following facts to be considered:
1. How did Brooks get into the

store~

(A) Is it plausible to believe a drunk man could
climb up a 2x10 plank leaning against a building, and though it was only 10 feet long, be able to
climb up to and through a window which was approximately 18 feet above the ground.
(B) Or is it more believable that the ladder, discovered at the rear of the building, had been used
by Brooks to climb through the window and that
after he had entered the store, that it had been
removed and hidden so as not to attract attention.
2. Was appellant so intoxicated that he had no
knowledge of Brooks whereabouts at the time he was
arrested~
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(A) Is it plausible to believe that appellant was
so intoxicated that he did not see Brooks inside
the building when he was in front of the store and
he did not know that Brooks had entered the
building?
(B) Or is it more believable to assume that appelant was participating in the burglary to the extent that he was acting as a look-out and had
removed the ladder after Brooks had entered
the store¥
3. Had appellant after he had been handcuffed and
placed in the police car under arrest, gotten out of the
car only to keep from getting it dirty?
(A) Is it possible to believe that appellant was
only interested in not dirtying the police car?
(B) Or is it more plausible to believe that appellant was trying to escape when he discovered the
police had left him unguarded?
In the light of the foregoing, it would appear that
counsel's objection was directed at the weight of the
evidence and not at its sufficiency. Though most of the
evidence introduced by the State was circumstantial, it
was consistent with the hypothesis of guilt when compared with facts that are proven. State v. Crawford, 59
Utah 39; 201 P. 1030. The evidence was such that it
effectively excluded the other theory presented by the
defense, i. e. that appellant and Brooks were so intoxicated they did not know what they were doing. State r.
rVells, 35 Utah 400, State 1-. Crawford supra. In the case
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of State v. Penderville, 2 Utah 2d 281; 272 P. 2d 195, this
honorable court commented as follows upon the duty
of the trial court when considering a motion to dismiss
or a motion for a directed verdict because of the lack of
evidence:
"It has been repeatedly held by this court
that upon a motion to dismiss or to direct a verdict
of not guilty for lack of evidence that the trial
court does not consider the weight of the evidence
or credibility of the witnesses, but determines the
naked legal proposition of law, whether there is
any substantial evidence of the guilt of the accused, and all reasonable inferences are to be taken
in favor of the state. State v. Lewellyn, 71 Utah
331, 266 P. 261; State v. Thatcher, 108 Utah 63,
167 P. 2d 258; State v. Aures, 102 Utah 113, 127 P.
2d 872; State v. Peterson, 121 Utah 229, 240 P. 2d
504. As is pointed out in one or more of these
cases, the trial court has a discretion in the case of
a motion for a new trial that it does not have in
case of a motion to dismiss or to direct a verdict of
not guilty. Nevertheless, in either case if there is
before the court evidence upon which reasonable
men might differ as to whether the defendant is or
is not guilty, he may deny the motion." (Emphasis
added.)
From the evidence presented at the trial one may
reasonably infer that the appellant was cooperating with
Brooks in the burglary; that appellant assisted Brooks by
helping him to enter the store and that appellant
was attempting to escape when he found he was left
unguarded in the police car. The fact that the appellant and Brooks had been together throughout the
evening hours of July 2, 1955, and were still within
close proximity of each other during the burglary, would
11
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also allow the jury to draw an inference that there had
been cooperation and planning by the two prior to the
entry of the store by Brooks. The California Supreme
Court in the case of People v. Adams, 119 Cal. App. 2d
445, 259 P. 2d 56 commented as follows :
''If the evidence against the appellant, considered by itself without regard to conflicting evidence, tends to support the verdict, the question
ceases to be one of law, of which this court alone
has jurisdiction, and becomes one of fact upon
which the decision of the trial court or jury is final
and conclusive. * * * Questions as to the weight
of the evidence and the credibility of the witnesses
are for the trier of fact, and it may believe and
accept a portion of the testimony of a witness and
disbelieve the remainder. * "' * People v. Henderson, 34 Cal. 2d 340, 346; 209 P. 2d 785. People v.
Thomas, 103 Cal. App. 2d 669, * * *''
Another California case, People v. Huizenga, 34
Calif. 2d 669 213 P. 2d 710 quotes very extensively from
the federal case, Curley v. United States, 81 U. S. App.
D. C. 389 160 F. 2d 229. In the Curley case the court thoroughly examined the history of the rule of law that requires the judge to submit to the jury the question of
the credibility of the witness and the weight of the
evidence.
" '* * * This contention confuses the function
of court and jury by implying that if the court
itself can formulate a reasonable theory of innocence from the evidence it must reverse a judgment of. conviction. It is not for the court, however, to determine whether it can formulate such
a theorv. It must assume in favor of the verdict
the exi~tence of every fact that the jury could reasonably deduce from the evidence and then deter12
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mine whether or not a reasonable jury could find
the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.
* * * Thus, the rule that the circumstances relied
upon by the prosecution must be consistent with
guilt and inconsistent with an hypothesis of innocence is a rule of instruction for the jury, and is
not the rule for the guidance of the court on review. People v. Newland, supra, 15 Cal. 2d [678],
at page 682,104 P. 2d [778], at page 780.
'' 'The functions of the jury include the determination of the credibility of witnesses, the
weighing of the evidence, and the drawing of justifiable inferences of fact from proven facts. It
is the function of the judge to deny the jury any
opportunity to operate beyond its province. The
jury may not be permitted to conjecture merely,
or to conclude upon pure speculation or from passion, prejudice or sympathy. The critical point in
this boundary is the existence or non-existence of
a reasonable doubt as to guilt. If the evidence is
such that reasonable jurymen must necessarily
have such a doubt, the judge must require acquittal, because no other result is permissible within
the fixed bounds of jury consideration. But if a
reasonable mind might fairly have a reasonable
doubt or might fairly not have one, the case is for
the jury, and the decision is for the jurors to make.
The law recognizes that the scope of a reasonable
mind is broad. Its conclusion is not always a point
certain, but, upon given evidence, may be one of
a number of conclusions. Both innocence and guilt
beyond reasonable doubt may lie fairly within the
limits of reasonable conclusion from given facts.
The judge's function is exhausted when he determines that the evidence does or does not permit
the conclusion of guilt beyond reasonable doubt
within the fair operation of a reasonable mind.'
Curley v. United States, 81 U. S. App. D. C. 389,
160 F. 2d 229, 232." (Emphasis added.)
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Section 76-1-44 Utah Code Annotated 1953 provides
in part as follows:
''All persons concerned in the commission of
a crime, either felony or misdemeanor, whether
they directly commit the act constituting the offense or aid and abet in its commission * * * or,
* * * have advised and encouraged its commission, * * * are principals in the crime so committed.''
One is an ''aider'' and ''a better'' in the commission
of any crime if he is an active partner in the intent
which was the crime's basic element and the least degree of concert or collusion between parties to an illegal
transaction makes acts of one the acts of all. Cammonwealth v. Lowry, 89 Atl. 2d 733, 374 Penn. 594; Dye v.
State, 40 S. 2d 641, 34 Ala. App. 371; State v. Lord, 84 P.
2d 80, 42 New Mexico 638. Under this definition a person to be found an aider or abetter must have participated in some way in the commission of a crime. The
participation need only be enouragement.
Therefore, the respondent feels that the judge in
refusing appellant's motion to dismiss the information
did not violate the discretion vested in him, and, in fact,
was obligated to allow the matter to go to the jury.
CONCLUSION
The verdict of the lower court should be sustained.
Respectfully submitted
E. R. CALLISTER
Attorney General
MAURICE D. JONES
Assistant Attorney General
Attorneys for Respondent
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